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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1614 
_____________ 
 
NICOLE MOLL, Administrator of the Estate of Paul L. Robbins, III, 
                                                                         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY  
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(M.D. Pa. No. 1-14-cv-1040) 
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 4, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: May 18, 2017) 
______________ 
 
OPINION*  
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Nicole Moll, administrator of the estate of her stepfather, Paul L. Robbins, III, 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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seeks review of the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of 
Pruco Life Insurance Company.1  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the 
District Court’s decision.   
I. FACTS 
 On July 3, 2012, Robbins obtained a life insurance policy from Pruco, naming his 
three stepchildren (Moll, Larry Reinhardt, III, and Christine Reinhardt) and Moll’s minor 
son as the beneficiaries of the $250,000 death benefit.  Under the terms of the policy, 
“[c]ontract premiums are due on the contract date and every 1 month after that date.”  
(Supp. App. 5.)  The contract date was July 3, 2012, thus making payments due on the 
third of each month.  The contract also provided for a 31-day grace period, as required by 
40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 510(b).  That is, “[i]f the premium has not been 
paid by its due date, the contract will stay in force during the grace period.  If the 
premium has not been paid when its grace period is over, the contract will end and have 
no value.”  (Supp. App. 12.)   
 Robbins made the first payment of $42.53 via debit card on July 14, 2012.2  He 
did not make the payment due on August 3, 2012.  Instead, on August 20, 2012, Robbins 
submitted Pruco’s “Request for Initial Premium (E-PAY) and/or to Establish Monthly 
                                                 
1 Our review of the District Court’s decision is plenary.  Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. 
Stevens & Ricci Inc., 835 F.3d 388, 402 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Tristani ex rel. Karnes v. 
Richman, 652 F.3d 360, 366 (3d Cir. 2011)).  
 
2 While Robbins’s bank statements showed his initial payment was deducted from 
his bank account on July 14, 2012, Pruco’s records reflected a payment date of August 
23, 2012, which was the date the payment was processed after the policy was fully 
underwritten.  
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Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT)” form (the “EFT Form”) authorizing payments to be 
made monthly by automatic withdrawal from his bank account.  The EFT Form asked the 
insured to select a date on which withdrawals would be made, stating that “[t]he monthly 
withdrawal date must be on or before the premium due date.”  (Supp. App. 71.)  Despite 
this instruction, Robbins selected the 18th as his withdrawal date.  By letter dated August 
24, 2012, Pruco informed Robbins that the first withdrawal for the missed August 
payment would be made on September 10, 2012, and that the September payment would 
be withdrawn from his account on September 18, 2012.  The record shows that all 
subsequent withdrawals were made on the 18th (or the next business day if the 18th fell 
on a weekend or holiday) of every month.  
 The automatic withdrawals continued until February 9, 2013 when Robbins called 
Pruco, expressing his desire to cancel his policy.  During that call, the Pruco 
representative explained that the withdrawal for the February payment was already 
scheduled, the March withdrawal would be stopped, Robbins’s coverage was in force 
until March 3, 2013, and the paperwork for cancelling the policy would be mailed to him.  
Robbins did not complete the cancellation paperwork, but he called Pruco again on 
March 11, 2013 to confirm the policy was cancelled.  Since he had not completed the 
necessary cancellation form, the policy was still in effect.  However, the representative 
explained that “if [he] would want to keep the policy, the quarterly premium [was] 
$125.22.  This [was] due March 3, 2013.  If [he] want[ed] to keep the policy, [he had] 
until April 3, 2013 to make the payment.”  (Supp. App. 30.)   
Robbins never completed the cancellation paperwork, but he also never made 
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another payment on the policy, despite receiving written reminder notices dated February 
20, 2013 and March 8, 2013.  As a result, upon conclusion of the 31-day grace period, the 
policy lapsed on April 3, 2013.  On April 8, 2013, Robbins died of an unexpected, 
massive heart attack.  
II. DISCUSSION3 
 Before the District Court, Moll asserted that Pruco breached an implied 
contractual provision created by Pennsylvania’s Insurance Department Act of 1921, 40 
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 510(a), which provides that all life insurance policies 
“shall . . . contain[] . . . [a] provision that all premiums shall be payable in advance.”  
Applying Pennsylvania’s Statutory Construction Act,4 the District Court concluded that 
“a permissive interpretation [of ‘payable in advance’] best effectuates the legislature’s 
intent.”  (App. 14.)  That is, Moll’s requested interpretation of “payable in advance” as 
requiring all payments to be made prior to the due date “would nullify the grace period 
[provision].”  (Id.)  As the District Court noted, such a strict interpretation would be in 
contravention of Pennsylvania’s statutory construction principles. 
 Before us, Moll argues that the District Court erred by accepting Pruco’s 
permissive interpretation of the statutory phrase “all premiums shall be payable in 
advance.”  Moll contends that “such an interpretation results in a law that serves no real 
                                                 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1291.   
 
4 Pennsylvania’s Statutory Construction Act requires that “[e]very statute [] be 
construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.”  1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 1921(a).   
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purpose and, importantly, fails to meet the test of ‘more favorable to the policyholder.’”  
(Appellant’s Br. 15 (quoting 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 510).)  Essentially, 
Moll asserts that this phrase should instead be read as requiring all payments to be made 
prior to their due date.  As the District Court aptly concluded, however, this interpretation 
would render 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 510(b), which establishes a grace 
period for payments, being superfluous and devoid of meaning.  Contrary to Moll’s 
assertion, a permissive interpretation protects the public by providing flexibility in the 
payment schedule.   
Moll also contends that the District Court misconstrued her argument.  Her 
true position is that §510(a) exists to prevent precisely the scenario 
which occurred here in which the insurer relied on the earlier due 
date when calculating the statutorily-mandated grace period while at 
the same time regularly collecting the premium approximately two 
weeks beyond the original due date, a process which had the effect 
of a establishing a new, later due date. 
 
(Appellant’s Br. 14.)   
Moll’s argument is flawed in at least two respects.  First, no support exists in the 
statute, case law, or the contract for her assertion that Pruco’s acceptance of late 
payments pursuant to the EFT Form effectively established a new due date.5  In fact, 
accepting this argument would create an unmanageable payment system for insurance 
                                                 
5 Moll claims that Pruco mandated when payments were made.  To the contrary, 
Robbins established the payment schedule when he completed the EFT Form, and, 
contrary to the form’s instruction, chose a payment date that was after the due date.  
Moreover, despite her arguments regarding the effect of the EFT Form, Moll concedes 
that she “did not and does not assert that the EFT Agreement constituted a modification 
of the Policy.”  (Appellant’s Br. 19.)  Only a modification of the policy could alter the 
payment due date.   
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premiums, which would effectively eliminate any certainty or clarity for both the insured 
and the insurance company.  That is, accepting Moll’s position would result in an ever-
changing due date for premium payments since each late payment would adjust the due 
date for subsequent premiums.   
Second, her claim that §510(a) exists to prevent the situation presented here 
ignores the grace period established in §510(b).  As the District Court noted, Moll’s 
suggested interpretation “would nullify the grace period” which would “violate[] the 
Statutory Construction Act’s overarching command that a statute must be construed ‘to 
give effect to all its provisions.’”  (App. 14 (quoting 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1921(a)).)  In fact, Moll concedes as much, stating that “such a position is too rigid and 
obviously not proper in light of the fact that the Insurance Act explicitly allows for 
payment of an overdue premium to be made after the due date by virtue of the grace 
period provided for in [§510(b)].”  (Appellant’s Br. 14.)   
Moll’s remaining arguments are variations on the theme that Robbins’s payments 
should have been applied to the upcoming due date as opposed to the past due date, in 
accordance with the “payable in advance” provision.  Moll comments that “Pruco 
inarguably did not make Robbins’ [sic] premiums payable in advance.”  (Appellant’s Br. 
12.)  Moll insists that the February 19, 2013 payment was for the March 3, 2013 due date, 
resulting in the next payment being due on April 3, 2013.  As a result, the grace period 
would end on May 3, 2013, resulting in Robbins dying within the grace period.  Statutory 
interpretation aside, this scenario defies common sense since it would result in Robbins 
having missed one month’s payment during the brief existence of the policy.  As the 
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record shows, Robbins never made a payment on or before the due date. 6  All of his 
payments, including the first one, were made after the due date.   
 Moll also argues that insurance premiums must be payable in advance to avoid 
confusion among insureds over the default date, and faults Pruco for never issuing default 
notices.  As Pruco’s representative, Angela Pompey, explained, “by us electronically 
withdrawing [the] payments, we know that every month [the] premium is going to be 
paid and the policy will never enter its grace [period].”  (Supp. App. 119.)  Therefore, so 
long as the automatic payment authorization was in effect, there was no need for Pruco to 
send default notices.  When Robbins withdrew his automatic payment authorization on 
February 9, 2013, Pruco began sending reminder notices regarding the payment that was 
due on March 3, 2013.  As noted above, the March 3, 2013 payment was never made.  
After the final payment for February 3, 2013 was made and the 31-day grace period 
                                                 
6 Robbins’s payment history for the Pruco policy is summarized as follows: 
 
Premium Due Date  Payment Date  Amount 
July 3, 2012   July 14, 2012   $42.53 (Visa debit) 
Aug. 3, 2012   Sept. 10, 2012  $42.53 (EFT) 
Sept. 3, 2012   Sept. 18, 2012  $42.53 (EFT) 
Oct. 3, 2012   Oct. 18, 2012   $42.53 (EFT) 
Nov. 3, 2012   Nov. 19, 2012  $42.53 (EFT) 
Dec. 3, 2012   Dec. 18, 2012  $42.53 (EFT) 
Jan. 3, 2013   Jan. 19, 2013   $42.53 (EFT) 
Feb. 3, 2013   Feb. 19, 2013  $42.53 (EFT) 
 
(App. 7.)  As Moll notes, “[i]f Pruco had applied Robbins’ [sic] premiums as ‘payable in 
advance’ as required by law” or “[h]ad Pruco merely applied Robbins’ [sic] premiums for 
the premium period ahead, . . . his death would have fallen within [the grace] period and 
coverage would be afforded.”  (Appellant’s Br. 18.)  This could not have happened given 
the number of payments Robbins made.  Thus, the March 3, 2013 payment was never 
made, and the grace period ended on April 3, 2013.   
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expired, the policy lapsed.   
Finally, Moll argues that “Pruco’s actions in violating Pennsylvania law and its 
own EFT Agreement, improperly applying premiums, relying on its improper application 
of the premium to justify denying the claim and then forcing the beneficiaries to litigate 
the matter . . . provide sufficient evidence of bad faith.”  (Appellant’s Br. 23.)  The 
District Court evaluated this claim under Pennsylvania’s insurance bad faith statute, 42 
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8371, and correctly concluded that Pruco’s actions 
did not amount to bad faith.  
Pennsylvania courts broadly consider an insurer’s bad faith to be “any frivolous or 
unfounded refusal to pay proceeds of a policy; it is not necessary that such refusal be 
fraudulent.”  Terletsky v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 680, 688 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1994) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 139 (6th ed. 1990)).  “‘[T]o recover 
under a claim of bad faith,’ the insured must show that the insurer ‘did not have a 
reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy and that the insurer knew of or 
recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis in denying the claim.’”  Amica Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Fogel, 656 F.3d 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2011), as amended (Dec. 9, 2011) (quoting 
Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 688).  Here, Pruco’s actions did not constitute bad faith because 
Pruco had a reasonable basis for denying benefits.  As the District Court noted, Robbins 
knew of his “impending policy lapse” but “made no premium payments to prevent this 
lapse, [so] Pruco appropriately and timely declined to pay the death benefits.”  (App. 18.)   
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III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s decision granting 
summary judgment in favor of Pruco. 
